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NOTES AND COMMENTS
RISK DISTRIBUTION AND SEAWORTHINESS
One of the most controversial sections of admiralty law is the doc-
trine of seaworthiness: the strict-liability duty of care owed by ship-
owners to maritime employees. From its inception as a contractual duty
to provide a safe ship for the crew, seaworthiness has become a gener-
ous shelter under which a wide variety of maritime workers other than
seamen have won tort damages for injuries occurring both on and off
ship. Because seaworthiness imposes a unique double burden on the
shipping industry-strict liability plus full common-law recovery-its
extension to employees other than seamen has provoked opposition
from industry spokesmen and from commentators, who accuse the
courts of distorting the historical basis and traditional purposes of the
doctrine.
The seaworthiness controversy is more than a ripple in the back-
waters of admiralty. It raises basic issues of tort policy: who is the
appropriate party to bear the loss of injuries? What should be the
extent of that liability? Should workers in dangerous occupations be
given specially broad protection? To compose a rational theory of
compensation for injured maritime workers, all these questions must
be examined.
Confusion is the central feature of contemporary seaworthiness doc-
trine. Overlapping statutory and judicial efforts to protect injured
maritime workers have created a procedural merry-go-round, in which
workers bypass the statutory limits of compensation against their em-
ployers by suing third-party shipowners for much larger damages. The
shipowners, in turn, recover against employers through indemnifica-
tion. More important, current seaworthiness doctrine offers no co-
herent method for determining which workers shall benefit from its
liberal recovery.
The root cause of current controversy is the leading case of Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,1 in which a longshoreman recovered against
1. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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a shipowner for an injury caused by a structural defect in the ship's
boom. The Supreme Court permitted seaworthiness recovery despite
the facts: (a) that his employer was an independent contractor, not
the shipowner; (b) that Sieracki was a longshoreman, not a seaman;
(c) that the manufacturer of the boom, not the shipowner, was negli-
gent; and (d) that Sieracki could have recovered (albeit a lesser
amount) under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, the federal workmen's compensation scheme. The long arm
of Sieracki has extended seaworthiness coverage to virtually any ship-
board injury suffered by any maritime employee, and to some dockside
injuries as well.
The opponents of a broad seaworthiness doctrine argue that this is
both economically and historically ill-advised. By singling out ship-
owners for strict liability, the courts have forced the shipping industry
to adopt uncompetitive prices. Further, the critics attack a key histori-
cal argument in Sieracki: that seaworthiness should cover both seamen
and harbor workers because the occupations were once identical, with
seamen performing the duties of harbor workers. The opponents claim
that seaworthiness developed in response to the unusual hazards of the
sea: that harbor workers and seamen were never considered members
of the same occupation; and that the expansion of seaworthiness to
include harbor workers resulted from twentieth-century misreadings
of prior case law.2
These critics have ignored the singular contribution of Sieracki to
the problem of providing compensation for maritime injuries. Not
only does Sieracki accurately reflect a historical identity between sea-
men and other maritime employees; it also provides the basis for in-
corporating risk distribution theory into maritime law. While the doc-
trine of seaworthiness is today both procedurally and substantively at
sea, use of this risk theory will aid in resolving the dilemmas of the
modem doctrine.
I. THE HISTORICAL PATTERN OF SEAWORTHINESS
A. Origins of the Doctrine
The duty of the ship's master and owner to provide a seaworthy ship
was recognized by American courts as early as 1789, but only under a
contract theory.3 The courts openly read implied terms into the ship's
2. Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen.
111 U. PA. L. REv. 1137, 1148-51 (1963); Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness and the Rights
of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381, 386-403; Note, 34 CAuF. L. REv. 601, 603.04.
3. Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789); Rice v. The Poll) and
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articles, so that sailors could make reasonable complaints without risk-
ing a charge of mutiny or a forfeiture of wages for breach of rigorous
shipboard discipline.4 In effect, the implied contractual obligations
were designed to excuse the crewmen from performance under unusu-
ally harsh conditions; and recovery was sought for wages under the
contract of employment rather than for physical injury.6
During the late nineteenth century, however, courts were impressed
by the similarity between the contractual duties of seaworthiness and
the emerging common-law tort duties of the employer to provide a safe
place to work. Maritime workers increasingly recovered tort damages
for injuries caused by unsafe and unfit conditions on board ship.0 In
time, federal courts jettisoned their contract theory of seaworthiness.7
Kitty, 20 Fed. Cas. 666 (No. 11,754) (D. Pa. 1789); The Moslem, 17 Fed. Cas. 894 (No.
9875) (8.D.N.Y. 1846). As compensation for their physical injuries, seamen recovered only
their traditional remedy of maintenance and cure. Reed v. Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas. 426, 429
(No. 11,641) (C.C.D. Mass. 1832). In addition to the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, two
other obligations appear to have been imposed: (1) that mariners must be supplied with
sufficient food and drink; (2) that mariners should be treated with decent humanity.
Dixon v. The Cyrus, supra; Rice v. The Polly and Kitty, supra.
4. As any reader of sea stories knows, the 19th-century captain ran a tight ship.
Whippings and beatings were commonplace. See Rice v. The Polly and Kitty, supra note
3; 2 PARSONS, TREATLsE ON THE LAW OF SHIPPING AND THE LAW AND PRAGaTcE OF ADmRALTrY
79 (1869). DANA, Two YERS BEFORE THE MAST ch. XV (1911) provides an account of one
such incident, under a captain of reasonably good reputation.
5. Courts do not appear to have permitted recovery of tort damages for injuries
caused by an unseaworthy condition until the 1870's. Justice Story indicates in Reed v.
Canfield, supra note 3, at 429, that as late as the 1830's, a seaman could recover only his
traditional remedy of maintenance and cure, except in the extraordinary instance of
injury while saving the ship from "impending perils." PArsONS, op. Cit. supra note 4, at
78, disposes of seaworthiness in one short paragraph: he describes it only as a doctrine
which excuses a seaman from proceeding on a voyage. In the period 1870-1900, however,
numerous cases giving tort remedies in seaworthiness actions appear in the literature, See
Halverson v. Nisen, 11 Fed. Cas. 310 (No. 5970) (D. Cal. 1876); Clowes v. The Frank and
Willie, 45 Fed. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1891). Note the following standard articulated in Halverson
v. Nisen, supra, at 310:
[The shipowner's] liability [in furnishing a seaworthy ship] does not differ from
that of any other master to a servant in his employment. It is the master's duty
in all cases to use ordinary care and diligence to provide sound and safe materials
for his servants. But he does not warrant them to be so nor insure the servant
against the consequences of their defects.
In adapting common-law tort principles to maritime law, federal courts failed initially
to distinguish between a duty of seaworthiness and the ordinary duty of care. For
example, Halverson v. Nisen, supra, The Noddleburn, 28 Fed. 855 (D. Ore. 1886), and
Clowes v. The Frank and Willie, supra, all trace the source of injury to a defective
piece of equipment; yet The Noddleburn speaks almost exclusively of seaworthiness,
Halverson uses the term in a rather off-hand manner, and The Frank and Willie ignores
the word entirely.
6. Dixon v. The Cyrus, supra note 3; Rice v. The Polly and Kitty, supra note 8;
The Moslem, supra note 3.
7. The Anaces, 93 Fed. 240 (4th Cir. 1899).
1176 (Vol. 75:1174
SEAWORTHINESS
Soon the federal judiciary expanded seaworthiness beyond the con-
fines of common-law employer's liability. Unhampered by conservative
precedents of state courts,8 admiralty was free to mold tort concepts to
meet the unique needs of maritime workers, who were thought to be
particularly susceptible to injury.9 Instead of a due care standard, em-
ployers were held to something approaching strict liability. 0 Contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk merely mitigated damages, in-
stead of absolutely barring recovery."
American longshoremen were quickly attracted by the liberal awards
in seaworthiness cases. Although their occupation was readily distin-
guishable from the seamen's by the nineteenth century, admiralty
courts exercised jurisdiction over longshoremen's tort claims as well.
Longshoremen consistently recovered from the shipowner for injuries
8. The fundamental bases of American admiralty law derive not from the English
common law but from the usages and customs of international trade. Gilmore and Black
note that:
Certainly the early opinions (especially those of Story) prove that the courts looked
on the maritime system they were administering as international in scope, for
they are replete with citations to the continental European authorities, not for
persuasive analogy but "as evidence of the general maritime law."
GIMORE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 41 (1957).
This international common law, uncertain in origin and scope, gave federal courts
an unusual amount of flexibility in developing an American maritime law of tort. See
Justice Story's remarks in The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. 1, 52 (1826). cited infra note 11.
In England a warranty of seaworthiness was extended to seamen by statute. After the
English courts denied the existence of such a warranty in Couch v. Steel, 3 E & B 402,
118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854), Parliament enacted the English Merchant Shipping Act
of 1876, 39 and 40 Vict. c. 80, § 5 (1877). The English legislation may have influenced
some American courts, but at least one American case recognized the shipowner's tort
liability before 1877. Halverson v. Nisen, supra note 5. Another disapproved Couch v.
Steel, supra, as if it were the extant law of England in 1886. The Noddleburn, supra
note 5, at 857.
9. Admiralty courts have been consistently solicitous of the great risks of injury seamen
encounter. See Dixon v. The Cyrus, supra note 3 (dictum). Note the reasoning used
to modify the fellow-servant rule in Peterson v. The Chandos, 4 Fed. 645, 650 (D. Ore.
1880).
10. Compare Clowes v. The Frank and Willie, supra note 5, at 496, with The Lynd-
hurst, 149 Fed. 900 (E.D.N.Y. 1906).
11. The Supreme Court, analogizing to ship collision cases, upheld a comparative
fault theory of assessing damages in The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890). The opinion
implicitiy sounded the death of assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery, citing
with approval the dictum of Justice Story in The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. 1. 54-55
(1826) that:
[C]ourts of admiralty are in the habit of giving or withholding damages upon
enlarged principles of justice and equity, and have not circumscrihed themselves
within the positive boundaries of mere municipal law.
That assumption of risk was not an absolute bar to recovery was soon made explicit.
Hansen v. The Julia Fowler, 49 Fed. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1892). See also Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939).
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caused by physical defects in the ship and its equipment, despite the
fact that they were employed directly by an independent contractor.12
The nineteenth-century decisions, however, left unclear whether the
duty of seaworthiness also applied to non-shipowners (such as stevedore-
employers) who failed to provide a safe place of employment.
After some confusion in the lower courts, the Supreme Court held
in Atlantic Transportation Co. v. Imbrovek's that a longshoreman
could sue his stevedore-employer in admiralty under a seaworthiness
theory. The Court made a maritime relations test the key to seaworthi-
ness recovery for non-seamen. If the claimant could meet this test by
showing that his job was one of the duties formerly performed by
seamen, and if he passed a location test, i.e., if the injury occurred
while on board ship, then admiralty courts had jurisdiction.14 As sea-
men had at one time performed the longshoremen's handling func-
12. From about 1880, there is a continuous line of cases granting recovery to longshore-
men for injuries caused by defective ship's equipment. See, e.g., The Anaces, supra
note 7. See also Gerrity v. The Bark Kate Cann, 2 Fed. 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1880); The Hellos,
12 Fed. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1882); The Rheola, 19 Fed. 926 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884); The Max
Morris, 24 Fed. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); The Carolina, 30 Fed. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1886); Keliher
v. The Nebo, 40 Fed. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1889); The Protos, 48 Fed. 919 (C.C.E.D. 1891); Steel v.
McNeil, 60 Fed. 105 (5th Cir. 1894); The Elton, 83 Fed. 519 (4th Cir. 1897).
Though they classified the longshoreman as an invitee, early admiralty decisions did
not distinguish between the duty of care owed by the shipowner to him and that
owed to the seaman. In The Rheola, supra, at 927, the court stated:
As the libelant was not directly employed by the master, and could only look to
the master stevedore for his pay, there was no privity of contract between him and
the ship-owners. Nor did the relation of master and servant, in its technical
sense, exist between the libelant and the ship-owner. But it is conceived that this
does not in the least affect the obligation of the master not to be negligent towards
the libelant, or the degree of care which it was incumbent on him to exercise.
The libelant was performing a service in which the ship-owners had an interest,
and which they contemplated would be performed by the use of appliances which
they had agreed to provide. They were under the same obligation to him not to
expose him to unnecessary danger, that they were under to the master stevedore, ills
employer. There was no express contract obligation on their part to either to provide
safe and suitable appliances, but they were under an implied duty to each . ..
The implied obligation . . . is to use proper care and diligence to see that such
instrumentalities are safe and suitable for the purpose.
Once the courts perceived the shipowner's duty to invitee and employee to be the
same, they saw no reason to differentiate between the two groups when the duty grew
stricter. The common law governing the business invitee did not inhibit judicial devel-
opment of the duty of care, because once transferred to the admiralty side of the court,
it became a "maritime duty." "This neglect was the neglect of a maritime duty, and
attaches to the ship herself." Gerrity v. The Bark Kate Cann, supra, at 247. Of course,
the independence of maritime law from the common law was well-established, note 8
supra.
13. 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
14. Id. at 61-62.
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tions, these workers were historically part of the maritime industry and
thus within admiralty jurisdiction.r
Imbrovek was by no means the first case to extend admiralty law
benefits to longshoremen, 6 but its historical argument invited criti-
cism. The Court's conclusions were unsupported by any evidence that
seamen once performed the jobs of loading and stowing cargo.
17
The critics' scholarship is as bad as the Court's, however, when they
dismiss the historical argument for identifying seamen and other mari-
time workers as a single occupational class.'8 Well into the nineteenth
century, long after longshoremen became a distinct occupational
group, seamen assisted them in loading, unloading, and stowing cargo.
These duties varied with the type and size of port, ship, and cargo. 10
Often, individuals moved freely between the two professions, depend-
ing on employment opportunities.20 The rigid division of function
15. Ibid. Despite the Court's ambiguous stance on the maritime relations test in
Imbrovek, since that time it has continually repeated its assertion that admiralty
jurisdiction extends over the maritime industry as it was historically structured, and in
particular, that it extends to maritime workers if they perform duties once assigned
to seamen. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), the Court used the
historical test and the exclusive nature of the jurisdiction granted by the admiralty
clause of the Constitution, U.S. CoNst. art. I, § 2, to strike down attempts to apply
state workmen's compensation laws to longshoremen working on the high seas or in
navigable waters. In International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). the
Court found a longshoreman to be a seaman at least to the extent of including him
under the provisions of the Jones Act.
16. See note 12 supra. The literature is not overpopulated with pre-1914 seaworthiness
cases for several reasons. Defenses such as the fellow-servant rule probably inhibited
the bringing of a substantial number of suits. Secondly, during the short period when it
was not clear that admiralty tort doctrines offered a more open path to recovery than
the common law, maritime workers had little reason to forego the advantages of a
common-law jury trial in a state forum. The district court which tried Inbrovmk noted
this fact. Imbrovek v. Hamburg-American Steam Packet Co., 190 Fed. 229, 237 (D. Md.
1911). The same court also remarked upon the general failure to appeal this type of
case, leading to unreported decisions.
17. Thus the separate occupatibnal class of longshoremen arose before loading and
stowing became a specialized function. See note 20 infra.
18. Shields 8: Byrne, supra note 2; Tetreault, supra note 2, at 413-14. Tetreault offers
a more balanced view of the historical structure of the industry but fails to recognize
the fluidity of its labor component.
19. During the 17th and 18th centuries, seamen commonly loaded and unloaded cargo.
See A. P. MIDDLETON, TOBACCO CoAsr: A MA~trrm' HsroRy oF CiiE1EAKE BAY I TILE
COLONIAL ERA, 103 n.48, 170 (1953); J. D. Prnps, SALs.Nt IN Tim 18Tn CE.rST"y 87, 88
(1937); DANA, Two YEAs Brrom rH= MAsr 93, 106 (1911). See also The Noddleburn,
supra note 5.
In larger ports, day laborers rather than sailors were generally employed simply be-
cause it was cheaper to hire men on daily pay than to keep a crew on monthly %ages
and provide them with provisions while in port. Dixon v. The Cyrus, supra note 3.
20. Unlike his English counterpart, the American seaman was one of the most highly
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which later occurred as a result of unionization and technological
change had only begun to make its appearance in the later nineteenth
century. Thus, the Supreme Court had good reason to find a close
historical relationship between the two occupations. Whether this his-
torical identity should matter in defining the scope of seaworthiness
will be examined later.
B. Congress and the Court-A Case Study in Confusion
When Imbrovek was decided in 1914, seaworthiness doctrine had
not been completely liberalized. 21 The fellow servant rule still was an
obstacle to compensation for injuries caused by fellow employees.
paid American workers in the 18th century. The sea was also the place where a young
man sought wealth and adventure. Thus, there was greater mobility into and out of the
profession than in England where sailors were looked upon as a menial class. Tun TRADE
WINDS 103 (N. Parkinson ed., 1948); S. E. MORISON, MARITIME HISTORY OF MAssAciuUSurr,
1783-1860 96 (1921). The same individuals were likely to provide day labor in unloading
in between voyages or after their return.
21. The Supreme Court determined the general outlines of seaworthiness in The
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903) with four propositions:
1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is
wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure,
and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued.
2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable
to an indemnity for injuries received by a seaman in consequence of the unsea-
worthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances
appurtenant to the ship....
3. That all members of the crew, except, perhaps, the master, are, as between
themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover for injuries sustained
through the negligence of another member of the crew beyond the expense of their
maintenance and cure.
4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of
the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and cure,
whether the injuries were received by negligence or accident.
Proposition (1) was a traditional statement of the seaman's rights to maintenance and
cure. Propositions (2)-(4) provided a statement of seaworthiness that is less straightfor-
ward than at first glance. For the first time, the Court clearly differentiated between
seaworthiness (physical defects in the ship and its equipment) and operating negligence
(injuries proximately caused by officers or crew of the ship). Recovery for injuries of
the latter sort was effectively barred by the fellow-servant rule.
Left unresolved by the Court were two imposing problems-the distinction between
seaworthiness and operating negligence, and the precise duty of care imposed by
seaworthiness. The first question proved especially tricky since a substantial proportion
of maritime injuries were caused by equipment made defective by the actions of others.
Uncertainty over who or what would be found the proximate cause led seamen and
harbor workers to seek alternative remedies whenever they were available. See notes
22, 27, 31 infra. The standard which measured the duty of care imposed by seaworthiness
was quite ambiguous. One can read an implication of an absolute duty of care Into
proposition (2). Courts do not appear to have picked up this reading, however. inbrovek
phrased the duty as one of proper diligence.
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More important, the warranty of seaworthiness was limited to physical
defects in the ship, its equipment, and its appurtenances. Operating
errors of master or crew were beyond its reach.
If a seaman was injured by a captain rather than a capstan, he was
restricted to the traditional and very limited remedy of maintenance
and cure, while the harbor worker was forced to resort to state com-
mon-law courts, with their rigid defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk.
Influenced by the growing concern of state legislatures with ade-
quate worker protection, Congress after 1917 began to expand the
remedies for injured maritime workers. The Jones Act of 1920" ap-
plied the provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability Act2 to sea-
men. The latter act granted full common-law recovery for injuries
caused by operating negligence and abolished the fellow-servant rule.24
To protect harbor workers, Congress at first tried to place them within
state workmen's compensation schemes,29 but the Supreme Court
branded each of its attempts unconstitutional as an invalid delegation
of admiralty power to the states.2 Thus, in 1924, only seamen were
covered by any statutory compensation plan.2 7
It was at this point that judicial and congressional attemps to pro-
vide harbor workers with protection became monumentally entangled.
In 1926 the Supreme Court held in International Stevedoring Co. v.
Haverty28 that harbor workers were Jones Act "seamen." This inter-
pretation flouted clear evidence that Congress had intended no such
reading of the Jones Act.2 9 As Justice Cardozo was later to remark of
Haverty, "[V]erbal niceties were bent to the overmastering purpose of
the act to give protection to workers injured upon ships."' 0
In placing harbor workers within the ambit of the Jones Act, the
Supreme Court appeared to have eliminated any need to secure ade-
22. 88 Stat. 1164 (1915), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). The Jones Act presents a whole
array of interesting problems unfortunately beyond the scope of this note. For an
excellent account, see GmmoRE & BLAcK, Ten LAw OF ADNttA.LTY § 6-20 et seq.
23. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
24. See Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930).
25. 40 Stat. 595 (1917), 42 Stat. 634 (1922).
26. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. 1%. C. Dawson
& Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
27. Of course, harbor workers injured in localities not within maritime jurisdiction
were protected by workmen's compensation under their respective state statutes.
28. 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
29. That Congress did not intend any such construction of the Jones Act is apparent
from its attempts to place harbor workers entirely within state compensation schemes
note 25 supra.
30. 'Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 156 (1934).
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quate compensation for injured maritime employees by statute. How-
ever, at the time of the Haverty decision, Congress had already com-
pleted committee action on a bill for federal maritime worker
protection. Apparently unwilling to entrust such protection to Haverty's
dubious construction of the Jones Act, Congress in 1927 passed the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.31 Congres-
sional failure to reckon with the Haverty decision proved costly, be-
cause the new act effectively if unintentionally undercut the liberal
benefits for harbor workers provided for in Haverty.
Under Section 5 of the Act,3 2 the statutory compensation scheme be-
came the worker's exclusive remedy against his employer. Neither
liberal recovery under the Jones Act, nor a seaworthiness action against
employers was now available. Instead, the harbor worker had to be
content with the limited, albeit certain, remedies of workmen's com-
pensation.33
There was one important exception to the exclusive remedy of the
statute. Section 33 of the Harbor Workers' Act34 preserved the rights
of action against third parties-i.e., shipowners--under any appro-
priate theories of liability, including seaworthiness. Yet at first, no one
attempted to invoke Section 33, primarily because seaworthiness did
not offer recovery for operating negligence. Section 33 became an im-
portant escape hatch from the Harbor Workers' Act when this barrier
fell in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.35 With subsequent expansion,
Mahnich made seaworthiness remedies available for injuries caused by
operating negligence as well as physical defects in the ship or its ap-
purtenances.
Mahnich involved a seaman, but the new magnetism of the
broadened seaworthiness doctrine soon attracted longshoremen, via
the third party right of action in Section 33 of the Harbor Workers'
Act. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,30 the Supreme Court permitted
31. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as The Harbor
Workers' Act].
32. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
33. Recovery under the Harbor Workers' Act is limited to medical expenses, 33
U.S.C. § 907 (1964); disability compensation (under which the maximum which can be
received is 66 2/3% of average weekly wages over the period the disability lasts), 33
U.S.C. § 908 (1964); and some compensation in the event of death, 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1964).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1964).
35. 321 U.S. 96 (1944). For harbor workers, there is the added benefit of what In
effect is a guaranteed minimum recovery. Under the Harbor Workers' Act, the harbor
worker may recover from his employer the excess of what he is entitled to under the
act over his recovery from a third party. 33 U.S.C. § 933(f) (1964).
36. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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longshoremen to recover under seaworthiness. Sieracki, a longshore-
man injured by a latent defect in the ship's boom, sued the shipowner
for seaworthiness damages under Section 33. Accepting the District
Court's finding that the shipowner had been duly diligent in inspecting
the boom,3 7 the Supreme Court nonetheless held the shipowner liable
for the injury, invoking the strict liability dictum of Malhnich:
[Seaworthiness] is essentially a species of liability without fault,
analogous to other well-known instances in our law. Derived
from and shaped to meet the hazards which performing the service
imposes, the liability is neither limited by conceptions of negli-
gence nor contractual in character .... It is a form of absolute
duty owing to all within range of its humanitarian policy.38
Subsequent courts have read Sieracki expansively, and a wide range
of maritime employees have been granted the comforts of seaworthiness.
Carpenters, 39 electricians, 40 shipcleaners,4 ' repairmen and riggers' 3
have convinced courts that they performed jobs formerly done by sea-
men and have taxed shipowners with an absolute duty of care. Further,
the work area covered by the doctrine has been extended; maritime
workers have recently gained seaworthiness protection for injuries
occurring on the dock and having only the most tenuous connection to
the ship. In Spann v. Lauritzen,44 a longshoreman recovered from the
shipowner after he was injured by a faulty hopper owned by his em-
ployer (an independent contractor) and located entirely on the pier.
In attempting to reconcile the decision with the locality test of Im-
brovek, the court noted that "the hopper was an instrumentality in the
unloading of the cargo.. ."45 and that the duty of absolute care ex-
tended to a ship's appurtenances. "That some other method might
have been used does not eliminate the means used for the unloading
of the cargo as part of the appurtenances to the vessel."
40
In making a longshoreman's third-party remedies far more attractive
than statutory recovery against employers, Sieracki threatened to foist
the entire burden of maritime accidents on the shipowners. The Su-
37. Id. at 87.
38. Id. at 94-95.
39. Pope S& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
40. Feinman v. A. H. Bull S.$. Co., 216 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1954).
41. Torres v. The Kastor, 227 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1955); Crawford v. Pope & Talbot
Inc., supra note 39.
42. Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953).
43. Amerocean S.S. Co. v. Copp, 245 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1957).
44. 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965).
45. Id. at 209.
46. Ibid.
1966] 1180"
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
preme Court, to prevent this hardship, allowed faultless shipowners
an indemnity against employers for employer-caused accidents. 47 But
this device, according to some critics, short-circuits the exclusive
remedy provision of the Harbor Workers' Act. A harbor worker in-
jured by his employer cannot get full recovery directly-but he can
sue the shipowner, who may in turn recover from the employer.
Sieracki, they charge, has led to a nightmare of circular litigation which
must be ended by limiting seaworthiness recovery to seamen alone.48
The legislative intent of the statutory limit on compensation, how-
ever, is far from clear.49 Rather than an outright repudiation of liberal
recovery, the legislators' primary concern seems to have been to in-
clude longshoremen within some scheme of compensation for no-
fault injuries. A limitation on damages was merely the common con-
stitutional justification for such legislation.60 Moreover, the exclusive
47. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). Indemnifica-
tion presents a further problem for the contracting parties. Founded in contract rather
than tort, indemnification lies even where the shipowner as well as the independent
contractor has been negligent. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355
U.S. 563 (1958). While the Court recognized that the shipowner owes an implied con-
tractual duty of care to the contractor, it held this duty was "not identical." This vague
language has led lower courts to find little duty at all. The shipowner's failure to inspect,
or to provide a properly seized light or properly set winch has been held not to bar
recovery. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 266 F.2d 79 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 816 (1959). The parties, of course, can alter the results by express contractual
provisions describing their responsibilities to one another.
On the other hand, the procedural difficulties posed by indemnification do not lend
themselves to contractual resolution. Irrespective of the degree to which negligence or
cause can be assigned to any party, the shipowners bear a heavy litigation burden since
judicial determination of negligence and cause may well affect his right to indemnification
under express or implied contract provisions.
48. See Shields & Byrne, supra note 2, at 1150; Tetreault, supra note 2, at 413; Note,
34 CALIF. L. Rxv. 601, 604 (1946).
49. See Hearings on S. 3170 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); Hearings on H.R. 9498 Before a Sub-
committee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on S. 3170, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); H.R. REP. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); H.R. Rrat. No.
1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1927); S. REtP. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); 67 CoNe.
RFe. 10608-14 (1926); 68 CONG. RFe. 5402-14 (1927).
Critics are wrong when they assert that the Harbor Workers' Act indicates congres-
sional intent to treat harbor workers separately. There is substantial evidence that
seamen would have been included within the provisions of the Harbor Workers' Act,
had it not been for determined opposition by seamen's unions (explainable by the
larger measure of recovery provided by the Jones Act). Hearings on S. 3170 Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1926).
50. See PRossm, TiE LAw oF ToRTs 555 (3d ed. 1964):
It is recognized that this remedy is in the nature of a compromise, by which the
workman is to accept a limited compensation, usually less than the estimate a
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remedy provision is balanced by the clear third-party provisions in
section 33, which indicate no policy of limiting injured workers to a
single route of recovery. The Sieracki court had no basis on which to
divine the congressional will.
Other critics have alleged that Congress never intended to give
Section 33 the scope which it acquired in Sierachi. They point out that
at the time of the Act all available common-law actions against third
parties required a showing of fault. Congress, they argue, must have in-
tended Section 33 to encompass only those actions, and not the strict
liability remedy of seaworthiness, since the Act itself included a no-
fault recovery against the employer. When the employer ultimately
pays for a no-fault recovery through an elaborate series of law suits,
the intent of the statute is being circumvented.51 But this line of
criticism assumes that Congress intended to deny harbor workers the
benefits of any subsequent expansion in the common-law remedies
against third parties. There is no legislative history to support such a
restrictive reading of the Act. Congress was well aware that the scope
of tort remedies grows with time and that seaworthiness was a particu-
larly expansive cause of action. If the legislators wanted to freeze
the remedies for harbor workers, they knew how to say so.
From the courts' point of view, even the excess litigation under
Sieracki is preferable to excluding harbor workers from seaworthiness
protection. Longshoremen and seamen often receive injuries from
identical causes, under conditions of comparable risk. Only a statute
more explicitly restrictive than the Harbor Workers' Act could justify
divergent standards of recovery for the two classes of workers.
II. SrERACKI AND THE RSK THEoRY-A DEFINITIONAL MODERNIZATION
OF SEAWORTHINESS
There was more to the Sieracki opinion than its tale of maritime
history. Prior to Sieracki, admiralty had jurisdiction only over in-
juries occurring on board ship. This requirement derived from
the original duty imposed by the seaworthiness doctrine: the obliga-
tion to provide a safe ship. Once location was satisfied, the worker who
demonstrated that he did work formerly performed by seamen could
recover under seaworthiness.
52
jury might place upon his damages, in return for an extended liability of the
employer, and an assurance that he will be paid.
See New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
51. Note, 32 VA. L. Rzv. 1177, 1189 (1946); GILaom & BLAcik, AD.NuPsrLnV 362-63 (1957).
52. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, supra note 13.
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With Sieracki, however, came a new element as a primary purpose of
the doctrine. Rather than focusing on location and historical employ-
ment patterns, the opinion emphasized the risks undertaken by mari-
time workers, and the need to protect those who assume a high risk
of injury in their employment:
That the liability may not be... [limited by privity of contract]
would seem indicated by the stress the cases uniformly place upon
its relation, both in character and in scope, to the hazards of
marine service which unseaworthiness places on men who perform
it. These, together with their helplessness to ward off such perils
and the harshness of forcing them to shoulder alone the result-
ing personal disability and loss, have been thought to justify and
require putting their burden . . . upon the owner regardless of
his fault. Those risks are avoidable by the owner to the extent
they may result from negligence. And beyond this, he is in a
position, as the worker is not, to distribute the loss in the shipping
community which receives the service and should bear its cost."3
While Sieracki represents a shift in tone and emphasis, rather than
an explicit revision of prior legal doctrine, it clearly alters the thrust
of seaworthiness protection. The maritime relations test remains, but
it is no longer primarily a means of establishing a certain historical
relationship. Rather, the test allows the courts to single out the ship-
ping industry's high-risk occupations.
As a preliminary attempt to connect the degree of liability with the
risks of maritime employment, the Sieracki decision reflects a sound
analysis of the industry. Whatever differences may exist between sea-
men and harbor workers-and, indeed, among sub-categories within
these classes-it is doubtful that there is a relevant distinction from the
viewpoint of industrial compensation. The common work area in itself
suggests a common undertaking of risk.54 Moreover, at least in the case
of longshoremen, there is substantial statistical evidence of high-risk
employment. Longshoremen have one of the highest accident-frequency
rates in American industry. The rates for longshoremen in the Port of
New York are higher than the rates of every other major industry
with the possible exception of logging.r5
53. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra note 1, at 93, 94. (Emphasis added.)
54. While an individual's personal skill, education, and general awareness of his
environment can markedly affect the personal risks of injury he takes, common environ-
mental factors are likely to create similar risks of injury among groups equally exposed
to them.
55. Statistics as to accident frequency rates (number of accidents per million man
hours worked) are not available for the maritime industry as a whole and arc difficult
to obtain for other industries. The one attempt to study the problem comprehensively
was made in 1954 by the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, the
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In the year surveyed, one out of every two longshoremen was injured
on the job, one out of every six suffered a disabling injury, and the
average cost of a disabling injury was $3,400 60 If the function of an
expansive seaworthiness doctrine is to protect persons peculiarly sus-
ceptible to injury, there is sound reason for including the harbor
worker as well as the seaman within its folds. There is no risk distinc-
tion, on the other hand, for excluding harbor workers-only a desire
to reduce costs through arbitrary classification.
Further, to the extent that workmen's compensation limits the
damages paid by the employer, someone else must bear the remaining
expense-either the employee, his family, private or public welfare,
or other insurers. Taxing the worker with this cost is the most
inequitable of these alternatives, since he is the one least likely to
have the resources for self-insurance. It is, rather, the shipping industry
which can most easily spread the risk of injury. It is especially impor-
tant that employees not be saddled with the expense of injuries where
injuries are both frequent and expensive. Given the uniquely grave
risk in the longshore industry, and the high cost of the average injury,
the case for shifting costs to the shipping community at large becomes
that much stronger. Moreover, economic efficiency within the shipping
industry would be improved by a regime of strict liability. If the
price of shipping reflected its full social cost, companies and ports
with low accident rates would be given their proper competitive ad-
vantage.5
7
It has been argued that seaworthiness damages will price the ship-
ping industry out of its market, destroying an industry vital to the
study being published as the MARmrm CARGO TRANsPoRTATIoN CoNF EN.ce Lo.csnonE
SAFETY SURvEy REPORT (1956) [hereinafter referred to as the LoNesnoRE SAFETY RronrT].
The LONGsHORE SAFETY REPORT 22-23, lists the following accident frequency rates for
hazardous industries in 1954.
Stevedoring ............................................................... 92.3
Logging ................................................................... 74.3
Structural Steel Erection ................................................... 47.5
Saw and Planing Mills .................................................... 42.0
General Building .......................................................... 37.0
In 1954 the longshore accident frequency rate in the Port of New York was approximately
66, rising to 83 in 1957, and then declining to the present level of 66.6 (with the exception
of a rather sharp rise in 1962). NEW YoRr SHIPPING AssocsAIoN, SAFET BREAU, ANNUAL
AccmENT (no page numbers) (1965).
56. LONGSHORE SAFrTY REPORT I.
57. Accident cost differentials among different ports can be quite striking. For example.
in the State of New York, the manual rate for Code 703, Stevedoring N. 0. C. is cur-
rently $17.90, while the same classification for the State of New Jersey is $11.70. This
manual rate is chargeable for each $100 of payroll-up to a maximum of $300 payroll
per week for any one employee.
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nation's defense.58 But this is no argument for casting the burden of
saving a sick industry upon the employee, who is least able to bear the
cost and least likely to insure himself against harbor accidents. If there
is a genuine social interest in preserving the American shipping in-
dustry, the government, rather than the worker, should pay the subsidy.
Given the economic and social advantages of risk redistribution,
Sieracki becomes a crucial case in the development of seaworthiness.
It points the way to remaking seaworthiness doctrine into a broad-
based strict-liability scheme, designed to protect high-risk employees
against maritime injuries. This guidepost, however, has not been
followed by most federal courts. They have held to the pre-Sieracki
theory of seaworthiness as a doctrine extending only to those who are
injured either on board ship or by its equipment or appurtenances
while doing work once performed by seamen. The result has been
an uneven, confused and artificial extension of seaworthiness coverage.
Technology and the Metaphysical Ship. A prime example of this
confusion arises when the longshoreman's injury occurred off the ship.
Under Imbrovek, seaworthiness was clearly limited to shipboard in-
juries; but, as we have seen, the non-shipboard injuries of longshore-
men involve similar high-risk dangers, and justify similarly liberal
recoveries. Since 1946, courts have reconciled the expansive protection
suggested by Sieracki with Imbrovek's locational limitations, by tor-
tuous constructions of what is and is not part of a ship.
The doctrine's gangplank to dockside injuries has been the tradi-
tional warranty that seaworthiness extends not only to the ship itself,
but to its "appurtenances": the gear, stowage, appliances, and equip-
ment. There is little problem in making a connection between the
injury and the ship when, for example, a ship's hatch falls while being
replaced and injures a longshoreman,59 or when the accident is caused
by cargo falling from the ship.60 But when the responsible tool is a
shore-based hopper or crane, the distinctions and analogies become
ludicrous.
A seaworthiness claim was rejected in McKnight v. N. M. Paterson
& Sons, Ltd.6' on the ground that a shore-based crane which caused
the injury was not traditionally carried by a ship:
58. Shields & Byrne, supra note 2, at 1148-52.
59. Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950) cert. denied,
341 U.S. 904 (1951).
60. Robillard v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 186 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
61. 181 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 913 (1961). See also Fredericks v. American Export Lines Inc., 227 F.2d 450




[I]t cannot be seriously contended that the crane... is equip-
ment commonly found among the ship's gear. Both its size and
sole function rebel against any argument that a ship might
"adopt" or "integrate" such equipment as part of its gear.0
The Ninth Circuit, on the same facts, reached exactly the opposite
result in Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 3 holding that seaworthiness
was applicable as the work performed by the crane had traditionally
been done by seamen; thus, the device was an "appurtenance" of the
ship:
[T]he well established rule that the shipowner is absolutely
liable for the results of defects in unloading equipment brought
on board ship by the stevedoring company should not be qualified
or modified if the unloading equipment thus used happens to be
newly designed and devised and involves none of the traditional
unloading gear of the ship. Use of more modem equipment can
no more exculpate the shipowner from his obligations than could
use of "more modem divisions of labor."
0 4
The seaworthiness doctrine can be seen to take much of its shape
from the eye of the beholder rather than from any uniform standards.
If an object must be carried on a ship to be an appurtenance, recovery
will be limited; but if its function is the key to "appurtenancy," a
wide range of non-shipboard equipment will qualify.
The latest attempt to find conceptual links between equipment and
ship is the recent Third Circuit case of Spann v. Lauritzen.0. Spann
was injured by a hopper located entirely on the pier and in no way
extending over the ship, unlike the cranes in the McKnight and Huff
cases. Adapting Huff's line of reasoning, the court granted seawor-
thiness recovery because the job done by the hopper was part of the
traditional unloading function once performed by seamen; and the
hopper was therefore an "appurtenance."
In these cases the courts usually respond to the maritime workers'
persuasive claims to full recovery for non-shipboard injuries. By cling-
ing to Imbrovek's location requirement, however, they force them-
selves to construct metaphysical links with the ship. Not surprisingly,
different circuits have clashing styles of shipbuilding.
The historical test, which makes seaworthiness recovery in the
rapidly automating longshore industry depend on the work patterns
62. McKnight v. N. M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd., 181 F. Supp. 434, 439 (NJ). Ohio), afl'd.
286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
63. 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 US. 943 (1965).
64. Id. at 212-13.
65. 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965).
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of nineteenth-century seamen, is even less rational. It is entirely pos-
sible under current doctrine to envision clerks or helicopter pilots
coming within seaworthiness, if they are injured while doing low-risk
or distinctly "non-maritime" work which seamen once performed, such
as unloading or inventorying. At the same time, a worker undertaking
high risks in maritime employment may be unable to make out a
tangible connection between injury and ship, and thus will be de-
prived of full recovery.06
In sum, current doctrine does not offer a seaworthiness theory
bounded by the kind of work done and the kinds of risks undertaken
by the employees. It fails in the two tasks such a doctrine must fulfill:
to provide a workable standard for the courts, and to reflect the reali-
ties of the contemporary maritime industry. By recognizing the justice
of expanded recovery without providing a definition of seaworthiness
to justify that recovery, the courts have made seaworthiness a con-
fused and unconvincing doctrine.
What is needed, then, is a seaworthiness doctrine which measures
recovery as much as possible by the scope of the risk undertaken. In
addition, Congress must end the wasteful litigation which ocurs when
the maritime worker sues the shipper who, in turn, seeks indemnifi-
cation from the employer.
III. PROPOSALS
A. Location as a Measurement of the Risk-A Modest Proposal
A rational seaworthiness doctrine would protect maritime workers
injured in the course of high-risk employment. If it makes no sense to
limit recovery to shipboard accidents, and if it is irrational to limit the
doctrine to artificial connections with the ship, how are courts to limit
the scope of the doctrine? To what extent can courts measure the risk
of particular maritime employment, and how does such a measure
affect the traditional requirements of location and maritime relations?
Of necessity, a maritime relationship must remain the foundation of
any seaworthiness doctrine. Even if the federal courts wanted to make
seaworthiness amphibian, their admiralty jurisdiction stops near the
water's edge. Some connection between the injured party and the
maritime industry is indispensable.
The key question, however, should not be whether the maritime
employee is performing work once done by seamen, but whether he
66. McKnight v. N. M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd., supra note 62, affords a particularly
striking example of a high risk employee being denied recovery.
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bears a high-risk relationship to the maritime industry. As Sierachi
pointed out, the special remedies of seaworthiness are designed to pro-
tect those peculiarly susceptible to injury, not every employee of a ship-
ping company.
A test most consistent with a risk-shifting approach would gauge
only the activities of the employee, without regard to location. Sea-
worthiness would embrace all maritime employees engaged in high-risk
occupations; generous protection would be directly linked with peril-
ous work. Unfortunately, this solution is utterly impractical: maritime
occupations are so varied, and statistics so poor, that a court could not
competently distinguish between high- or low-risk employees. It might
discriminate between longshoremen and clerks; but it could not hope
to do justice to the vast number of harbor workers whose work differs
from day to day.
67
Rather than measure risk directly, the court could try to define con-
ditions which produce high risk. The "location of the injury" test
would serve as a workable guide to dangerous maritime employment if
it were reformulated in terms of risk, instead of physical association
with the ship. Statistical evidence indicates that the great bulk of high-
risk maritime activity occurs at the ship and the adjoining dock.0s If
courts granted seaworthiness benefits to workers injured because of
human error or faulty conditions on the ship or dock, high-risk workers
would receive adequate protection without forcing courts to make ad
hoc distinctions beyond their capabilities.
It is true that some low-risk employees in the dock area would be
covered by the doctrine, since a location test is a generalization about
conditions of risk. This is unlikely to be a major cost factor, however,
as the great majority of injuries in the ship and dock area will be
suffered by vulnerable employees, whom any risk approach would
cover. The new location test would halt the expansion of seaworthiness
short of most low-risk workers and the industrial world at large.
A location test for seaworthiness would end the dispute over which
shore-based facilities are "functional appurtances" of the ship. Dock
workers would be covered because their place of work is highly dan-
gerous, not because it is conceptually assimilated to a ship. For all its
merits, however, the location test remains a compromise, limited by
'67. At present, neither the industry nor the government compiles accident statistics
by individual job classifications. Without these statistics a court would be unable to
discriminate intelligently between various classifications, e.g., between holdmen and ware-
housemen, though their respective accident frequency rates might vary radically.
68. LONGSHORE SAPETY REPORT 75.
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judicial resources and power. Assessing compensation for risks is far
more congenial to an administrative body, with the ability to make
detailed studies of the risk component in a particular job. But until
Congress becomes willing to entrust a full-recovery doctrine to an ad-
ministrative agency, the courts must deal with seaworthiness as best
they can. A ship-dock location boundary for the doctrine is the simplest
and most rational judicial approach.
B. Unraveling the Procedural Tangle-A Task for Congress
A reform of seaworthiness doctrine is incomplete without a pro-
cedural clean-up. At present, Section 5 of the Harbor Workers' Act
bars an injured longshoreman from recovering seaworthiness damages
from responsible employers. In order to obtain those benefits, he must
exercise his rights against third parties provided by Section 33 and sue
the shipowner, who in turn can gain indemnification from the em-
ployer. Out of deference to the unambiguous command of the statute,
the Supreme Court in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Re-
fitting Corp.69 rejected a plea that it apply a theory of contribution
against employers and shipowners who were both negligent. If change
is to come, it must be through congressional action.
One solution, proposed by the maritime industry, is to deprive long-
shoremen of the seaworthiness remedy by limiting that doctrine to the
crew of a vessel3 0 The industry view has certain advantages. Besides
reducing present procedural confusion, it could improve the industry's
competitive position without sacrificing what present social policy re-
flected in workmen's compensation laws normally considers adequate
employee protection.
It is always dangerous, however, to extrapolate social policy from
workmen's compensation legislation in which employers get limited
recoveries in return for absolute liability. The "tit-for-tat" theory
seems to have developed more as a response to anticipated constitu-
tional difficulties than as a genuine attempt to balance competing
interests. Thus considered, the theory becomes a rationale for legality,
69. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
70. H. R. REP. No. 207, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962). The bill received the support of
the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (with a minority report
signed by 7 members), the Department of Commerce, and the Department of the Treasury.
The Labor Department indicated disapproval and the Administration, acting through
the Bureau of the Budget, took no position. H. R. REP. No. 1515, 87th Cong., 2d Scss.
(1962). The bill failed to find its way through the Rules Committee. Letter from New




rather than an expression of legislative policy. Moreover, Congress
has allowed seaworthiness to expand for twenty years without any
legislative alteration.
Second, the industry proposal suffers from substantive inconsistency.
In essence, the industry suggests that Congress resolve a procedural
problem by abolishing a remedy--a remedy which would remain
available to other claimants undertaking similar risks because the
claimant is a longshoreman and not a seaman. Given the soundness of
risk distribution in the maritime industry, it is absurd to solve the
procedural dilemma of seaworthiness by eliminating from protection
a segment of the industry which undertakes risks similar to seamen.
That would replace procedural confusion with substantive injustice.
The most rational solution, therefore, would be congressional repeal
of the exclusive remedy provision of Section 5. By permitting a worker
to sue for full seaworthiness damages from a responsible employer, the
change would eliminate much of the expense of third party suits
against shipowners along with the burden of indemnification proceed-
ings. While complicated legal fights would remain where responsibility
was doubtful, it would, at the least, eliminate obviously faultless ship-
owners from suits where employers were clearly responsible. To that
extent, it would simplify the now lengthy route to proper allocation of
liabilities between shipowners and employers.
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